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ESS 2.0 – Establishing strategic hierarchy in Europe
Europe in search of its strategic culture
When the Heads of State and Government of the EU
member states approved the European Security
Strategy (ESS) in December 2003  – a 21-page docu-
ment, which had been prepared by Javier Solana and
his Policy Unit at the Council General Secretariat – it
was believed to be the initial event for the develop-
ment of a genuine European strategic culture. For
the first time the EU published a core document that
defined major threats and chal-
lenges to European stability
and security, as well as answers
and solutions at hand to coun-
ter the identified hazards and
which provided a long-term
vision: “A safer Europe in a bet-
ter world”.
But it turns out that proclaiming a more coherent, a
more active and a more capable Union in terms of
security and defence policy was more wishful think-
ing than preparation for concrete action. In reality
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in
general and its implementation in particular are
dominated by the individual interests of the 27 mem-
ber states, a non-transparent and ineffective decision
making process and the lack of political will from the
member states to contribute to the difficult tasks.
Moreover, there have been substantial changes in Eu-
rope’s geo-strategic environment. Certain challenges
have developed into real threats while at the same
time new challenges have entered the stage. Experts
as well as politicians therefore have been calling for
a revision of the ESS, because the text no longer re-
presents the reality of international relations. The ob-
jectives and means provided in the document are too
abstract and leave too much room for interpretation.
Even more importantly, the ESS lacks a prioritization
of the main objectives and an assignment of clearly
defined means to specific challenges.
Some of the aspects in the broader context of secu-
rity are missing completely in the document. Al-
though the security implications of climate change
or energy dependence are mentioned, these aspects
are still underestimated and not part of the para-
mount strategic framework. The same could be said
about epidemics, poverty or ecological degradation.
Thus, some of the challenges perceived as major
risks to people and society are not fully acknowl-
edged in the EU core document on security.
But the real problem concern-
ing the ESS is not the question
of what and what not it should
contain, but rather how it can
enable and develop a sense of
strategic culture and strategic
dialogue. What do member states
and international partners expect from such a secu-
rity strategy? There is no common idea of the objec-
tives of the ESS within the Union. For some it is not
ambitious enough, others criticise the militarized
nature of the document. Indeed, the ESS is designed
more like a guideline or an info-brochure for exter-
nal partners of the EU than a strategy paper. Con-
sidering the basic EU documents and various reports
by several EU bodies at hand a true strategic docu-
ment in the field of security and defence policy
would have to consist of the respective parts of the
Lisbon Treaty dealing with the Common Foreign
and Security Policy and the Common Security and
Defence Policy (CSDP), which foster the profile as
well as decision making structures of the EU on that
field and introduce new forms of cooperation, rele-
vant parts of the 2006 Long Term Vision (LTV) by the
European Defence Agency (EDA), and certain as-
pects of a publication by the European Union Insti-
tute for Security Studies in Paris from 2006 entitled
“The new global puzzle – What world for the EU in
2025”. However, such an oddly assorted document
still would not match the demands and objectives
“The real problem concerning the
ESS is not the question of what and
what not it should contain, but rather
how it can enable and develop a
sense of strategic culture and strate-
gic dialogue.”
The current debate within the European Union concerning the future of the European Security Strategy (ESS) is
misleading. What the EU really needs is a conceptual hierarchy that helps it to develop and implement a strate-
gic culture and identity. This would increase the EU’s reliability as a global actor as well as consolidate security
dialogues within the Union.
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linked to a strategic approach for defining and
implementing political action adequate for contrib-
uting to stability and security on a global basis. The
largest deficit of Europe´s strategic culture is not to
be found within the ESS, but rather in the non-exis-
tence of a conceptual hierarchy within Europe.
Nevertheless some member states in Europe have
declared that they would prefer a revision of the
implementation process of ESS than attempting to
find an agreement on a whole new strategy docu-
ment, which seems rather unrealistic to them.
Therefore, it is expected that during the French EU
Presidency of the second half of 2008 a set of new
security documents will be published, which will add
new aspects to the strategic debate. However, the
ESS will more or less remain the same.
Preventing the EU from falling into the trap of
unfulfilled high expectations 
Although the need for an ex-
tensive revision of the ESS is ob-
vious, the current debate more
or less circles around the form
of revision rather than the
question of where on the multilevel architecture of
strategy building and implementation the revised
text or implementation guideline should stand.
There are two basic risks here for the EU concerning
its credibility as a comprehensive international secu-
rity actor. Firstly, international partners such as the
United States might view the reluctance of some
member states to draft a completely new security
strategy as a sign of weakening support among EU
member states toward fulfilling international obliga-
tions. This might lead to an overall reduction of the
importance of CFSP and the Union as a whole for
the international strategic approach towards crisis
management and stabilization efforts. The moment
the Union provokes scepticism over whether it is
ready to step up to its obligations resulting from its
economic power – a connection which has been
stressed in the introduction of the ESS as well –
international partners such as the United States or
NATO might not take the political initiatives of the
EU serious the next time urgent action is required.
Secondly, the danger of high unfulfilled expectations
could lead to negative effects in relationship with
the European public, as well. It would leave too
much room for interpretation, also concerning the
strategic dialogue within the EU. The obvious gap
between rhetoric and reality might question the
EU’s reliability as an actor in international security
affairs. European citizens still would not have a
distinct vision about how the EU will engage in
global security.
Therefore, a mere review and increased efforts on
implementation will not be sufficient to create a
clear strategic framework for European security
and defence policy. The ESS is on the one hand too
abstract to serve as a pragmatic guideline for secu-
rity measures and on the other hand too specific on
several aspects to be a super-ordinated framework.
Since the original ESS was adopted in 2003, twelve
new countries have become EU members and the
global security priorities and the fundamentals of a
common European threat/risk perception have
changed. The implementation process can only
lead to a status report of the ESS follow-up docu-
ments. Neither any adjustment
according to new challenges
nor a higher level of concep-
tual clarity could be achieved
thereby.
The need for conceptual hierarchy
The different and in some cases even diverging
interpretations of the ESS and what to expect from
the current revision process have to do with the lack
of strategic culture in Europe. In order to define
what should be in the document and what not, one
needs to state first on which level of the strategic
conceptual hierarchy it stands. One cannot define
the deficits of the ESS if one is not capable of defin-
ing its relationship to other core documents such as
existing strategies and political initiatives of the
Union, for example the 2003 EU-strategy against the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD-Strategy), the EU Plan of Action on Com-
bating Terrorism or the Draft European Pact on Im-
migration and Asylum. The same is true for the rela-
tionship of the ESS to those guidelines or doctrines,
that the Union still lacks, e.g. a military doctrine or
operational guidelines for civilian and military en-
gagement. In addition to this, the multilevel struc-
ture of the EU creates papers and documents from
various EU-institutions and -bodies, which need to
interact with each other. This has lead to some con-
fusion and internal debates concerning the binding
nature of nationally implementing European initia-
tives. This is not only the case regarding security and
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“The obvious gap between rhetoric
and reality might question the EU’s
reliability as an actor in international
security affairs.”
defence issues. Another instance can be seen in the
area of energy politics and global warming. Instead
of an explicit top-level strategy on energy security
and the security aspects of climate change, there
exists a confusing set of proposals, action plans as
well as green and white papers.
Prior to a new ESS or a new implementation pro-
cess, the EU must therefore establish its own hier-
archy of concepts in order to define and locate the
strategies and their intent in an overall strategic
approach, which deals with the complex and diffi-
cult task of responding to security challenges and
risks on time and indentifying and implementing
specific answers and solutions. Besides, flexibility on
strategic threat and risk percep-
tion and necessary measures in
response to them is given by
the durability of the abstract
document at the top of the hier-
archical pyramid. Thus long-
term goals and values could
remain untouched, while capacities, measures and
geographic or thematic hot spots can be adjusted on
a regular base.
Conceptual Hierarchy
What the EU therefore needs to establish is a hier-
archical concept reaching from the big strategic
overlook to focused and detailed political action. The
introduction of four levels of ambition or aspiration
could prove to be helpful for a future strategy devel-
opment:
First, the EU might draft a document at grand stra-
tegic level, which could be named the European
Globalization Strategy (EGS). Within this core docu-
ment the Union could define its shared values and
interests, such as effective multilateralism, good
governance and the rule of law. The EGS should
define the EU’s role and profile in relationship to
other international actors and organisations such as
the United Nations, NATO, OSCE and WTO. Much
of the current ESS could be introduced into this
document, including the demand for a more active,
more coherent and more capable Europe in terms of
a broader international approach, not limited to tra-
ditional security or defence issues. It could also con-
sist of principal statements concerning the use of
force and the understanding of pre-emptive or pro-
active action. This document should be published
under the authority of the new EU President when
the Lisbon Treaty comes into force and would be
binding for the member states.
Second, a regular adjusted risk assessment report
named the Quadrennial Risk Review (QRR), which
could be published every four years. It should take a
look at major dynamics on the international stage
and analyse political, economic, ecologic and social
developments affecting security and stability. The
QRR could identify fields of primary interest to Eu-
ropean action and also analyse changes in the geo-
strategic environment that have occurred during the
past four years. European actions could be evaluated
and procedures for interventions or civilian/military
missions adjusted to the new developments. The
QRR could be developed in a
combined effort of the relevant
bodies and agencies of the
Council, e.g. the EUMC, the
CivCom, the European Defence
Agency or the European Union
Institute for Security Studies in
Paris. It should be published under the authority of
the High Representative of the Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy who will take office once
the Lisbon Treaty enters into force.
Third, sub-strategies have to be introduced, which
deal with specific policy fields and thus should be
developed by the responsible Commission-DG or
the Council Secretariat. Some of these already exist,
e.g. the EU strategy against the proliferation of wea-
pons of mass destruction or the EU Strategic Energy
Review. Others could be added, for example an
ESDP-strategy. These sub-strategies would be pre-
pared and approved within the Council. The sub-
strategies, in contrast to the EGS and the QRR,
would be more detailed and policy-oriented. The
benefit of a structured strategic hierarchy would be
the persistence of the paramount documents – the
EGS and the QRR – while the sub-strategies could
be adjusted to contemporary developments in inter-
national relations.
Fourth, the level of political action plans. Their
objective would be to translate the sub-strategies
into concrete political measures and a strict priority
of action. They can include long-term targets and
limited action on specific problems alike. As the
general principles of EU action are defined in the
supra-ordinated documents, more autonomy could
be granted to the Commissioner in charge or the
High Representative in devising these action plans.
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“The EU must establish its own
hierarchy of concepts in order to de-
fine and locate the strategies and
their intent in an overall strategic
approach.”
This would, on the one hand, allow more flexibility
and speed in responding to events on the interna-
tional stage, while still assuring coherence with the
leitmotifs of external action as formulated in the
EGS and the QRR.
A new strategic culture
Of course such a conceptual hierarchy within a
multi-level system as the European Union also de-
mands a better way of coordination and consulta-
tion. This would relate to the objective of a more co-
herent European Union as it has already been stated
in the ESS of 2003. Coherence must not only exist
between the different levels of strategy documents,
but also among different supranational and inter-
governmental actors within the EU system. The two
top-level documents could also stand as guidance
for member states in bilateral action outside the EU
context.
Next to the opportunity to revise the ESS, the idea of
conceptual hierarchy provides several benefits. First
of all the EU would become a more reliable actor in
international affairs as the Union’s partners would
receive the possibility to understand what its mo-
tives for engagement are. Second, the EU finally
would possess a comprehensive strategic framework
that covers long-term commitments as well as
guidelines for rapid response on various aspects of
security.
Third, the member states would gain more clarity of
what guides common action in different fields of
policy – from migration to defence – and how nation-
al capacities and capabilities may be involved. And
last but not least, citizens could see what the values
and interests of the EU are and how much the Union
already has become a security actor.
Conceptual hierarchy can be the nucleus of a new
strategic culture in Europe. The EU has become one
of the leading global security protagonists, more by
chance than by intention. Now it has to come to
terms with its strategic vision of comprehensive se-
curity and how the EU will be a part of it. The current
development in the Caucasus, the question of mis-
sile defence for Europe, and issues such as energy-
security demand the emancipation of Europe, not
only rhetorically but also practically.
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